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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of U.S. macroeconomic and mone-
tary news on market interest rate level and volatility. These news relate
to Federal Reserve System (FED) target variables and unexpected pol-
icy rate changes. It examines whether the fact that FED announces its
policy rate decisions immediately after each Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) meeting alters the market rate response. These meetings
occur regularly at scheduled time since February 1994. It also checks if
this transparency measure (i.e. announcing the policy rate immediately
after the meetings and regularly at scheduled time) has increased the pre-
dictability of FED's rates by the market. The results reveal that after
1994, ﬁnancial markets can better foresee monetary policy decisions com-
pared to the period when the policy rate was announced with a delay of
45 days after the meetings. Moreover, U.S. interest rate volatility is less
aﬀected by the announcements on FED target variables after 1994. In
the same way, unexpected monetary policy decisions inﬂuence less inter-
est rate level. These results suggest that, in accordance with theory, a
greater transparency improves market participants' understanding of the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy reaction function. Interestingly, the
date on which FED announces the policy rate decision has a greater im-
pact on U.S. interest rate volatility after 1994. This observation suggests
that the FED's credibility might have decreased after 1994. However, it
is not related to the immediate diﬀusion of policy rate decisions.
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1 Introduction
Aside from its negative eﬀect on the conduction of monetary policy by the
central bank1, high interest rate volatility blurs the prevision of the monetary
policy stance by ﬁnancial market participants. In order to provide a stable
environment for ﬁnancial market which facilitates to reach its target, central
banks seek to reduce interest rates variability (Goodfriend, 1990; Froyen and
Waud, 1995; Goodhard, 1996; Woodford, 1999)2,3. Indeed, it is easier for the
policy makers to reduce the uncertainty that they create themselves rather than
the uncertainty due to other factors.
Since the early 90s, most of the central banks in industrial countries have
adopted several measures aiming to improve the transparency of their policy
actions. The Federal Reserve Bank (FED), for example, has changed the way it
conducts monetary policy and the way it communicates monetary policy changes
to the public in order to improve transparency (Blinder, 1998; Blinder et al.,
2001). The FED decision of announcing its policy rate immediately after each
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, in February 1994, can be
considered as an example of these measures. Greater information about how a
central bank makes policy decisions helps to reduce ﬁnancial speculation, reduce
markets operators expectations about future monetary authorities decisions and
future evolution of the central bank target variables and then reduce market
volatility. The purpose of the present paper is to check if a greater transparency
enables to reduce market volatility by reducing the eﬀect of macroeconomic and
monetary news concerning the monetary policy on interest rate volatility.
Several empirical studies have examined the eﬀect of a greater transparency
on interest rate levels response to news related to monetary policy4. For in-
stance, Sellon and Weiner (1996), Kuttner (2001) and Urich and Wachtel (2001)
notice that a greater disclosure allowed to reduce U.S. interest rates response
to FED actions. In the same way, Gravelle and Moessner (2001) and Par-
1Interest rates instability inﬂuences the economic situation and central bank target vari-
ables and then importunes the monetary policy conduct.
2Central bankers job is to conduct monetary policy in order to promote price stability,
sustainable growth, and a stable ﬁnancial system.
3There have been a number of papers documenting and analysing the so-called "interest
rate smoothing" (Goodhart, 1996; Woodford, 1999). See Sack and Wiedland (2000) for a re-
views of the literature. Although the primary focus of that literature is the observed tendency
for the smoothing of policy rates, part of the motivation for such behavior has been to provide
a stable environment for ﬁnancial markets.
4See for example Sellon and Weiner (1996), Muller and Zelmer (1999), Haldane and Read
(2000), Clare and Courtenay (2001), Gravelle and Moessner (2001), Urich and Wachtel (2001),
Kuttner (2001), Parent (2003) and Coppel and Connolly (2003).
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ent (2003) ﬁnd that Canadian interest rates level react more to Canadian key
macroeconomic and monetary announcement news during the period following
the adoption of immediate diﬀusion of the Canadian monetary policy decisions
since 2000. On the other hand, several authors analyzed the impact of a greater
transparency on the accuracy of market forecasts of central bank policy rate
decisions (Tabellini, 1987; Dotsey, 1987; Rudin, 1988; Blinder, 1998; Kuttner,
2001; Haldane and Read, 2000; Poole et al., 2002; Lange et al., 2003; Poole and
Rasche, 2003; Swansson, 2004). More recent work has shown that the changes
in Federal Reserve disclosure policies in 1994 have increased predictability (Kut-
tner, 2001; Poole et al., 2001; Lange et al., 2003).
In addition to the eﬀect on interest rate levels, a greater transparency can
also aﬀect the impact of news related to monetary policy on interest rate volatil-
ity. Indeed, higher transparency enables to improve market operators knowledge
about monetary policy conduct and enhances the credibility of the central bank.
This, in turn, decreases the heterogeneity of agents expectations about future
policy decisions and future evolution of target variables. In the end, it should
reduce the uncertainty related the central bank monetary policy. However, in
the empirical literature, there is very little direct evidence of the impact of a
greater transparency on interest rate volatility response to key macroeconomic
and monetary announcement news (Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Lee, 2002, 2006).
Lee (2002, 2006) considers the eﬀect of a greater transparency on the impact of
central bank rate changes on market rate volatility. As for Chadha and Nolan
(2001), they analyze the eﬀect of central bank target news and unexpected mon-
etary policy rate changes on market rate volatility. Speciﬁcally, these authors
study the impacts of numerous changes in English monetary policy conduct on
the reaction of short-term interest rate volatility to announced decisions of the
Bank of England about its rate and to publications of the minutes of the Mon-
etary Policy Committee (MPC) meetings as well as to the publications of the
quarterly Inﬂation Report.
While ﬁnancial market volatility plays an important role in understanding
how ﬁnancial instruments are priced, most of the existing studies focus solely
on the eﬀect of a greater transparency on the reaction of interest rate levels to
news related to monetary policy. This paper aims at contributing to the exist-
ing literature by investigating whether and how the change in FOMC disclosure
policy introduced in February 1994 aﬀects U.S interest rate level and volatility
response to news related to FED policy. It also investigates whether a greater
transparency reduces ﬁnancial market uncertainty and improves predictability.
For the present analysis, two kinds of daily interest rate series (3 and 6 months
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rates and 3, 5, 7 and 10 years rate) and several macroeconomic news related
to FED target variables were used. Macroeconomic news include FED target
variables and the oﬃcial interest rate decisions about U.S. monetary policy. In-
terest rate dynamics are evaluated with an EGARCH model, as proposed by
Nelson (1991). This model enables to take into account the conditional het-
eroscedasticity eﬀect, asymmetric eﬀects and have the advantage of not having
to impose positively restrictions on the coeﬃcients in the conditional volatility
equation. To take into account the impact of the new transparency measure,
interest rates dynamics are evaluated for the sub-periods preceding and follow-
ing January 1994. Such an approach per sub-periods was used by the majority
of the authors analyzing the impact of monetary policy rate changes on rates
dynamics by taking into account new measurements of transparency and/or
credibility (see for example Urich and Wachtel, 2001; Chadha and Nolan, 2001;
Clare and Courtenay, 2001; Lee, 2002; Parent, 2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents how a new transparency
measure inﬂuences the response of interest rate level and volatility to central
bank target variables news and to monetary policy decisions. It also put in
evidence that the ability of ﬁnancial markets to anticipate FOMC policy changes
improved after 1994. Section 3 presents the data used for the analysis. In section
4, the examination of the data suggests that the ability of ﬁnancial markets
to anticipate FOMC policy decisions changes improved after 1994. Section
5 presents the model used to evaluate the response of interest rate level and
volatility to macroeconomic and monetary news (model EGARCH). Section 6
analyzes the results, and ﬁnally, section 7 concludes.
2 How can a greater transparency aﬀect the in-
terest rate response to news?
In countries in which central bank reaction functions are well-understood, un-
expected macroeconomic announcements should enable to anticipate accurately
monetary policy rate changes. Thus in this case only central bank target vari-
ables news should inﬂuence the dynamics of market interest rate. In contrast,
in countries where the conduct of monetary policy is less well-understood, one
would expect the reverse. More precisely, in this last case, interest rate dy-
namics do not react only to news on central bank target variables but also to
unexpected part of policy rates. In sum, the response of market interest rate
level and volatility to news on central bank target variables and to policy rate
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changes strongly depends on central bank's transparency and credibility (Hal-
dane and Read, 1999; Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001; Gravelle and Moessner,
2001; Parent, 2003; Coppel and Connolly, 2003). It follows that a new trans-
parency measure should aﬀect the reaction of market interest rate level and
volatility to news about monetary policy. The mechanism through which the
new transparency measure works is presented in what follows.
2.1 Impacts on interest rates response to central bank tar-
get variables news
A new transparency measure inﬂuences both directly and indirectly the response
of interest rate level and volatility to central bank objective variables news. The
direct eﬀect works through an increase in the transparency of the central bank.
As for the indirect eﬀect, it is related to a positive impact of higher transparency
on the central bank credibility.
According to Winkler (2000), if a new transparency measure is clearly, hon-
estly and eﬃciently communicated to the public, then it should increase the
transparency degree of central bank improving the understanding of the mone-
tary policy conduct by ﬁnancial agents. This implies that the markets will react
more fully to macroeconomic announcements that are relevant to the monetary
policy reaction function. Thus, in a world in which the central bank's reaction
function is better known by market participants, one would observe less ﬁnan-
cial asset price reactions to changes in monetary policy, but signiﬁcant reactions
to the release of surprise macroeconomic data that occur before the monetary
policy action date (Haldane and Read, 1999; Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001;
Gravelle and Moessner, 2001; Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Clare and Courtenay,
2001a, 2001b; Parent, 2003; Coppel and Connolly, 2003).
In addition, a more transparent monetary policy enhances central bank credi-
bility, reputation and ﬂexibility (Saxton, 1997; Geraats, 2000; Faust and Svens-
son, 2001; Cukierman, 2001; Jensen, 20025, Geraats et al. (2006))6. Those
5In Jensen's (2002) model increased transparency will increase the reputational costs of
deviations from the inﬂation target and therefore increase the credibility of the central bank.
6According to Saxton (1997), Geraats (2000), Faust and Svensson (2001), Cukierman
(2001) and Geraats et al. (2006), the advantages of a greater transparency on credibility,
reputation and ﬂexibility derive from the fact that transparency eases the private sector to
infer central bank's intentions regarding monetary policy decisions. This allows a central bank
to improve its credibility. It also gives the central bank a greater incentive to build reputation
as private sector inﬂation expectations become more sensitive to monetary policy decisions
and outcomes that are not attributed to economic shocks. At the same time, transparency
makes it clear when monetary policy decisions are intended to oﬀset economic shocks, so it
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advantages of transparency should allow to deliver greater overall policy out-
comes7, to reduce monetary policy uncertainty, to decrease heterogeneity in
agents' expectations, and to lower the risk premium related to future inﬂation
and interest rates level (Geraats et al., 2006)8. More precisely, an improved cred-
ibility and reputation enables investors' expectations to adjust faster to central
bank target variables news announcements, to reduce inﬂation expectations and
to decrease the heterogeneity of those expectations. Thus, enhanced ﬂexibility,
reputation and credibility implied by a greater transparency should increase the
response of interest rates levels to central bank target variables news.
As ﬁnancial market agents become better informed and because their expec-
tations are more homogeneous a greater transparency should reduce ﬁnancial
market volatility (Saxton, 1997; Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Raﬀerty and Toml-
janovich, 2002). A larger amount of relevant information about monetary policy
conduct enables private sector expectations to adjust faster to macroeconomic
and monetary variables announcement and to reduce uncertainties, decreasing
thus market volatility. With a consequent reduction in uncertainty, interest rates
volatility will react less to announcements on central bank target variables.
Empirical literature provides little direct evidence of the impact of a greater
transparency on interest rate level and volatility response to key macroeconomic
and monetary news. Gravelle and Moessner (2001) and Parent (2003) note that
such news related to the Canadian Central Bank inﬂuence more the interest
rates level during the period following the adoption of immediate Canadian
Central Bank rate disclosure in November 2000. Regarding market volatility,
only Chadha and Nolan (2001) analyze the eﬀect of a greater transparency
on market volatility response to macroeconomic and monetary news. These
authors ﬁnd that a greater transparency and credibility of the Bank of England
gives the central bank a greater ﬂexibility to stabilize the economy without aﬀecting market
operator's inﬂation expectations.
7Several authors ﬁnd a negative relation between central bank transparency and the level
and/or the variability of inﬂation (Chortareas et al., 2002; Cecchetti and Krause, 2002; De-
mertzis and Hughes Hallett, 2003; Ball and Sheridan, 2005). All these authors suggest that
greater transparency is associated with a reduction in uncertainty about future policy actions
and thus with a reduction in the inﬂation volatility. For instance, Chortareas et al. (2002)
examine the association between the cross-country diﬀerences in macroeconomic outcomes
and the degree of transparency exhibited by monetary policy, measured by the detail with
which central banks publish economic forecasts. Their results suggest that a high degree of
transparency in economic forecasts is associated with a lower inﬂation for all countries.
8Geraats et al. (2006) investigate whether transparency has improved the ﬂexibility and/or
reputation of central banks by allowing for lower policy, short and/or long nominal interest
rates. Those authors ﬁnd that increases in transparency tend to be associated with signiﬁcant
reductions in interest rates when controlling for macroeconomic conditions.
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have aﬀected short-term interest rate volatility reaction to the announcement
monetary policy rate decisions, of the publications of the minutes of the MPC
meetings and of the publications of the quarterly Inﬂation Report.
2.2 Impacts on the interest rates response to central bank
decisions
A new transparency measure aﬀects the interest rates level and volatility reac-
tion to changes in monetary policy rate mainly in two ways: ﬁrst by improving
market forecasts of central bank policy decisions and second by enhancing the
central bank credibility.
A greater transparency and a better market understanding of policy should
improve the accuracy of market forecasts of central bank policy decisions9, and
thereby, it should reduce interest rate responses to monetary policy actions
(Sellon and Weiner, 1996; Muller and Zelmer, 1999; Haldane and Read, 2000;
Clare and Courtenay, 2001a,b; Urich and Wachtel, 2001; Kuttner, 2001; Coppel
and Connolly, 2003). For example, Urich and Wachtel ﬁnd that, since the FED
began to announce the targets (1994), policy changes have had a lesser eﬀect
on U.S. interest rates. Haldane and Read (2000) ﬁnd empirical evidence that
the Bank of England eﬀorts for greater transparency have indeed decreased
markets reaction to oﬃcial interest rate changes. In the same direction, Muller
and Zelmer (1999) ﬁnd evidence in Canada that the increase in the national
bank transparency level has diminished markets reactions to oﬃcial monetary
policy rate changes.
Enhanced ﬂexibility, implied by a new transparency measure, would also
reduce the eﬀect of the policy rate on the market interest rate. In addition,
improved reputation would reduce inﬂation expectations and thereby long-term
nominal interest rates. In other words, a greater credibility should reduce the
impact of monetary policy rate changes on interest rate. This relation between
9Several authors study, both theoretically and empirically, the eﬀect of a new transparency
measure on the predictability of central bank decisions (Tabellini, 1987; Dotsey, 1987; Rudin,
1988; Blinder, 1998; Kuttner, 2001; Haldane and Read, 2000; Winkler, 2000; Poole et al.,
2002; Lange et al., 2003; Poole and Rasche, 2003; Swansson, 2004). For example, Haldane
and Read (2001) found that the introduction of inﬂation targeting in the United Kingdom
appears to have coincided with a marked dampening in yield curve responses, suggesting
greater transparency and predictability as the Bank of England monetary framework changed.
For the United States, Urich and Wachtel (2001), Poole and Rasche (2003), Lange et al. (2003)
and Swansson (2004) demonstrated that FED decisions predictability increased after the 1994
decision to announce changes in FED policy rates immediately after FOMC meetings.
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transparency, ﬂexibility and reputation as well as credibility and inﬂation ex-
pectations can explain the result obtained by Haldane and Read (1999). These
authors show that after the introduction of inﬂation targeting in the United
Kingdom in November 199210 English interest rates react less to monetary policy
decisions. Furthermore, since the beginning of 1993, detailed economic analysis
and inﬂation projections are published in the quarterly Inﬂation Report.
A new transparency measure should also reduce the delayed market response
and, thereby, increase immediate responses to policy changes. For example,
Urich and Wachtel show that after the FED began to announce immediately its
decision about its interest rate in 1994, U.S. interest rate began to react more
quickly to changes in monetary policy rate. In addition, lower uncertainty and
expected heterogeneity due to a greater transparency and credibility should re-
duce the eﬀect of the diﬀusion of monetary policy decisions on market volatility.
See for exemple, hadha and Nolan (2001), Lee (2002), who analyze the changes
in interest rate volatility response to changes in monetary policy rate.
3 Data Description and Preliminary Tests
This section presents the dataset and its statistical properties. The empiri-
cal part uses data series on interest rates, macroeconomic announcements and
unexpected variations of key interest rates.
3.1 Interest rates series
Two kinds of daily interest rate series are considered: a short term rate (Treasury
bills) and a Government bond rate corresponding to maturities of respectively
3 and 6 months and 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. These series cover the period ranging
from the ﬁrst of July 1990 to July, 30th, 2004. This data corresponds to the
quotes at local time market closure: 17:30 Eastern Standard Time (EST).
In order to determine the order of integration of these series we carry out a
series of unit-root tests. Three diﬀerent kinds of unit-root tests are performed:
the standard ADF test, the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test and ﬁnally the Seo
(1999) test. According to the results of the ADF test, displayed in table 5,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root for any of the four series.
These results are conﬁrmed for the Zivot and Andrews test as well as the Seo
test. The Seo statistic allows to account for structural changes in the series
while the former accounts for the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity.
10Chadha and Nolan (2001) argue that in the inﬂation targeting regime, central banks
attempt to establish credibility through transparency.
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Indeed, using Box-Pierce, Ljung-Box and LM statistics (see table 6), the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the 5% level for all assets considered
in our study. Thus, all interest rate series present a unit root and interest rates
diﬀerentials will be used in the empirical analysis. These interest rate series are
also conditionally heteroscedastic.
3.1.1 Announcements and surprises
According to Balduzzi et al. (1997), it is not the announcement per se that is
important, but rather the information it conveys to the market participants. In-
deed, if announcements only comfort agents in their expectations they will not
induce any behavioral changes. Since the aim of this paper is to study the eﬀect
of announcements on the dynamics of interest rates, series that reﬂect unan-
ticipated variations for the relevant series are needed. These "surprises" are
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the observed values for the variables and the
values that were anticipated. As anticipations cannot be observed directly some
approximation are needed. A solution suggests by Balduzzi et al. (1999) is to
choose the surveys published by Money Market Service (MMS) for US macroe-
conomic announcements. This organization collects every Friday forecasts from
a panel of market participants for the following week announcements. Median
values for each variable were computed. Those values were retained as proxies
of market participant expectations.
In more detail, these variables correspond to possible targets for central
banks. That is, primarily, news concerning the inﬂation rate and the global
health of the economies considered. The considered announcements concern
unemployment (UE), consumer price index (CPI), production price index (PPI),
gross domestic product (GDP), balance of payment (BP), and retail sales (RET).
All these variables are announced around 9:00 a.m.
Concerning the unexpected part of monetary policy decisions, two compu-
tation methods have been used in the literature. The ﬁrst method uses surveys
for macroeconomic announcements as previously discussed. The alternative
approximates central bank decisions through carefully chosen asset quotations.
More precisely, the methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001) suggests that FED
future fund prices constitute a suitable proxy for FED expected actions. This
latter solution is preferable to the surveys since, as pointed by Ehrmann and
Fratzcher (2003), (2005), the weekly frequency of surveys prevents from taking
into account most recent expectations. On the other hand, asset prices used
in this study are those from the day preceding central bank decisions. Prices
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Table 1: Percentage of expected and unexpected FED' rate changes
January 1990 - January 1994 January 1994 - June 2004
Actual Change
- Expected No Change 55.56% 3.13%
- Expected Change 44.44% 96.88%
Actual No Change
- Expected Change 0.00% 10.87%
- Expected No Change 100.00% 89.13%
Total
- Incorrect expectation 21.74% 7.69%
- Correct expectation 78.26% 92.31%
of future contracts on FED funds are a reasonable choice as they meet the re-
quirements put forward by Brooke et al. (2000), namely (i) its maturity is close
to that of the key interest rate, (ii) it is a liquid asset and (iii) its maturity is
shorter than the time interval between FOMC meetings. Moreover, as shown
by Krueger and Kuttner (1996), future prices provide an eﬃcient measure for
the FED fund rate forecasts. Indeed, forecast errors are uncorrelated with the
other variables observed at the contract's pricing time. Following Kuttner's
methodology, we extract the unexpected part of monetary authorities' deci-
sions, considering that this unexpected component is reﬂected by the diﬀerence
between the future prices on the announcement day and the day before. More
precisely, the relationship between the forecast error (∆r∗,nat ) and the future
contract rates can be written as follows:
∆r∗,nat =
T
T − τ (ft − ft−1), (1)
where f denotes interest rate on the future contract, T is the number of days
in the month under consideration and τ is the day of the month.
4 Eﬀects of a greater transparency on the pre-
dictability of the FED policy decisions
In order to check whether the new transparency measure adopted by the FED
improves the predictability of its decisions, the percentages of the expected and
unexpected part of the U.S. monetary policy decisions for the sub-periods pre-
ceding and following January 1994 were calculated. According to table 1, since
February 1994, period during which the FOMC has refrained from changing
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rates between meetings, market participants have been better able to anticipate
FOMC decisions. Before this period, when the FOMC changed its target rate
more frequently at unscheduled times between meetings compare to the period
during which FOMC changed the target at meetings, market participants were
less likely to correctly anticipate the FOMC decisions. Indeed, only 78.26% of
monetary policy decisions were anticipated before January 1994 compared to
92.31% of decisions that were foreseen after this date. These results reveal that
market operators better understand the eﬀective conduct of monetary policy
and/or they acknowledge better the credibility of the central bank while com-
paring to the period prior to January 1994. Similar results are obtained by
Poole and Rasche (2000, 2001, 2003), Urich and Wachtel (2001) and Lange et
al. (2003).
In addition, the immediate diﬀusion of FOMC policy since January 1994
should aﬀect interest rate responses to economic and monetary news. To assess
this impact, the model in the next section describes the news inﬂuence on the
interest rates conditional mean and volatility.
5 The Econometric Model
According to the unit-root test in Section 2, the interest rates ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
response to macroeconomic and policy news has been modelised as follows:
∆Rt = a+ b∆Rt−1 + c∆r∗t +
K∑
k=1
dkD
a
k,t +
3∑
j=1
ejJSt + t, (2)
where Rt denotes the U.S. interest rates diﬀerentials in period t. ∆r∗τ and
Dak,t, k = 1, . . . ,K correspond respectively to the unexpected part of the mone-
tary policy rate and to a set of U.S. macroeconomic news. c and dk measure the
eﬀect of these news on the interest rate level. As macroeconomics variables are
announced around 9 a.m and the FED diﬀuses its rate decisions about 2:30 p.m.
then Government bond rates in period t respond to macroeconomic news and
monetary policy decisions announced on the same day (period t). In addition to
macroeconomic and policy news, three days of the week are take into account;
namely Monday (Mo), Wednesday (We) and Friday (Fr).
The term t corresponds to the innovation series. Several authors estimate
equation (2) supposing that the innovations are a Gaussian white noise (Bal-
duzzi et al., 1999; Bernhardsen, 2000; Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001; Favero,
2001; Kearney, 2001; Caporale and Williams, 2002; Parent, 2003). In the same
line, equation (2) was estimated, ﬁrst by supposing that the innovations are a
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Gaussian white noise and Engle Arch LM statistics was then applied to check
whether the innovations t are conditionally homoscedastic. Table 7, in the
Appendix, enables to reject the null hypothesis and then accept the hypothesis
that the interest rates volatility is conditionally heteroscedastic. Since Boller-
slev proposed the GARCH models in 1986, numerous authors used such model
to take into account the persistence in conditional variances of ﬁnancial market.
In a GARCH model, an unanticipated drop and an unanticipated rise in the
same magnitude in an interest rate are assumed to generate the same impact on
its future volatility. However, authors like Kim and Sheen (2000), Lee (2002)
and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002, 2003, 2005)), argue that the size and the
sign of the shocks inﬂuence diﬀerently the future ﬁnancial market volatility. On
the other hand, DeGoij and Marquering (2006) ﬁnd that asymmetric volatil-
ity in the Treasury bond market can largely be explained by macroeconomic
announcement news. This suggests that the asymmetric volatility found in gov-
ernment bond markets is likely due to misspeciﬁcation of the volatility model.
Indeed, after having included macroeconomic announcements into their model,
they notice that the asymmetry disappears. In order to take into account the
conditional heteroscedasticy eﬀect and to check the asymmetric eﬀect, the expo-
nential GARCH (EGARCH) approach of Nelson (1991) was applied to estimate
the eﬀect of macroeconomic and monetary news on the conditional variances of
the interest rates. One of the advantages of the EGARCH model is the non im-
position of positively restrictions on the coeﬃcients in the conditional variance
equation. This model can be expressed as:
ln(ht) = w + α
t−1√
ht−1
+ βln(ht−1) + θ(| t−1√
ht−1
| −
√
2/pi)
+ γDumr∗τ +
K∑
k=1
ϕkDum
a
k,t +
3∑
j=1
λjJSt. (3)
The term α reﬂects diﬀerent impacts of positive and negative innovations
on conditional variances. A positive (resp. negative) α estimate implies that a
positive innovation increases volatility more (resp. less) than a negative (resp.
positive) innovation of an equal magnitude. The term θ determines the size
eﬀect. As in equation (2), the inﬂuence of macroeconomic and policy variables
is considered. But dummies instead of actual news were used in order to avoid
multicollinearity with the conditional mean regressors.
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6 Empirical results
In order to take into account the impact of the transparency measure adopted by
the FED in 1994, the interest rate dynamics have been estimated as described
by equations (2) and (3) for the sub-periods preceding and following February
199411. The results are presented and discussed in what follows.
6.1 General results
According to table 3, before and after January 1994, U.S. interest rates are
mainly sensitive to the consumer price index news (dCPI). In addition, dur-
ing the ﬁrst sub-period, short term interest rate level reacts to news relative
to economic growth as measured by GDP and retail sales (dGDP and dRET ).
After 1994, news on unemployment aﬀect medium term interest rates. All the
news, except unemployment news, have a positive impact on Treasury bills and
Government bonds rates. This is in accordance with theoretical expectancies.
Indeed, the CPI can be used as a proxy for the inﬂation rate. As such, a positive
surprise corresponds to an underestimation of the inﬂation level. In this case,
market investors will revise their expectations about FED monetary policy. The
negative eﬀect of unemployment news can also be explained if market operators
trust monetary policies on their capacity to control inﬂationary shocks. In other
words, they have enough conﬁdence in central bank to achieve its employment
target by reducing interest rates without imperilling their inﬂation objective.
Concerning the impact of GDP news, most theories predict that an unexpected
increase in real activity and inﬂation should raise bond yields. More precisely,
if increasing economic activity is coupled with higher investment, inducing thus
a higher demand for capital, interest rates should rise given a ﬁnite elastic-
ity of capital supply. Information about higher economic activity might also
change agents' expectations of future inﬂation rates, as inﬂation can be spurred
by an overheating economy. Therefore, an unexpected increase in real activity
could drive interest rates up through higher real rates and/or higher inﬂation
expectations.
As for the unexpected part of FED decisions, they inﬂuence positively U.S.
interest rates and the amplitude of this eﬀect is increasing with maturity (see
11Such an approach per sub-period was used by the majority of the authors analyzing the
impact of the monetary policy rate change on the dynamics of the rates by taking account of
new measurements of transparency and/or credibility of the central bank (Urich and Wachtel,
2001; Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Clare and Courtenay, 2001a,b; Lee, 2002). It was also used by
Parent (2003), who studies the impact of the shocks of the variables relating to the Canadian
monetary policy on the level of the rates of the market.
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Table 3) (c). This positive eﬀect has already been shown by empirical studies
such as Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), Kim and Sheen (2000) or Lee
(2002). Cook and Hahn are the ﬁrst to establish a positive empirical relationship
between central bank rates and long term rates. They argue that their results
support the expectations theory of the term structure12. Table 3 points out an
important decrease in U.S. interest rate reaction to unexpected policy decisions
after 1994. Indeed, the unexpected policy decisions inﬂuence all interest rates
before 1994. In contrast, after 1994, only two interest rates react to policy
decisions. In addition, the overall size of interest rate response to unexpected
changes in the FED rate tends to diminish after 1994. To illustrate this eﬀect,
the 6-month interest rate reaction to unexpected policy decisions was 0.6423
before 1994 whereas this reaction falled down to 0.3532 after 1994.
On the volatility side, Table 4 shows that prior to 1994, the unemployment
and the consumer price index together with the gross domestic product rate
announcement days are the principal variables which aﬀect and amplify interest
rate volatility (ϕUE , ϕCPI and ϕGDP ). In contrast, after 1994, U.S. interest
rate volatility is no longer aﬀected by the announcement days of FED objective
variables. Concerning the eﬀect of the diﬀusion of FED decisions, the results
are somewhat diﬀerent. Indeed, posterior to 1994, the announcement days of
the policy decisions amplify more the interest rate volatility compares to the
preceding period (see Table 4) (γ). Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst sub-period, these
announcement days inﬂuence only the 3-month U.S. interest rate volatility. In
contrast, after 1994, the diﬀusion of the FED decisions aﬀects positively the
volatility of all interest rates. The results obtained for the second sub-period
are in accordance with the results obtained by Lee (2002). This author ﬁnds
that in the most recent period there is larger correlation between U.S. interest
rate volatility and fund rate target changes.
In contrast with the results obtained by DeGoij and Marquering (2006),
incorporating macroeconomic announcements into the model does not eliminate
the asymmetry in the EGARCH model. Indeed, Table 4 shows that during
the ﬁrst sub-period, positive and negative innovations do not have the same
impact on conditional variances (α). More precisely and as expected, a positive
(resp. negative) innovation increases volatility more (resp. less) than a negative
(resp. positive) innovation of an equal magnitude. In contrast, on the second
sub-period, the size of the innovations has a large impact on the conditional
12The expectations theory says that a long term interest rate should be equal to the average
of the short term interest rates over the same period of time plus a term premium; thus, an
increase in the ﬁrst couple of short rate should drive up the long rate in a lesser extent. Roley
and Sellon (1995) show historical evidence in support of this view.
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variance of the interest rate.
It appears that agents seemed to be more sensitive to inﬂation shocks than
to those which aﬀect economic growth and unemployment (GDP, RET, BP, UE)
during the both sub-periods. During the ﬁrst sub-period, there was a greater
uncertainty about inﬂation than about unemployment and growth. During this
period, the FED continuously decreased its main interest rate. This decrease
had a positive impact on economic growth and then on employment. This policy
and another factor enabled to go out recession. According the NBER, U.S.
economy went on expansion in March 1991. Contrary, this policy inﬂuenced
negatively the inﬂation. Then, the inﬂation level and the negative impact of
the monetary policy rate decrease on the inﬂation level can explain greater
uncertainty concerning the inﬂation during the ﬁrst sub-period. Turning now
on the second sub-period, the latter was marked by important decrease and
increase of the unemployment rate and the consumer price index. Concerning
the monetary policy conduct, the FED decreased more their main rate than
increased its, enabling US economy to grow. According to NBER, during the
second sub-period, the U.S. economy was an expanding path, except from March
to November 2001.
6.2 Transparency and credibility of the FED - Discussion
The result that the eﬀects of the FED target variables announcements on U.S.
interest rate volatility decrease in the second sub-period veriﬁes the theoretical
implications about the eﬀects of a new transparency measure. Indeed, accord-
ing section 2, in the period following the implementation of the a transparency
measure, interest rate volatility should be less inﬂuenced by announcements on
macroeconomic and monetary variables. Similarly, the decrease of unexpected
changes in FED rates on the interest rate level suggests an increase in its trans-
parency and/or credibility. As mentioned in section 2, a new transparency
measure inﬂuences the reaction of the interest rate to changes in monetary pol-
icy decisions by improving market forecasts of FED decisions and by enhancing
its credibility. The ﬁrst link assumes that a new transparency measure enhances
the accuracy of the ﬁnancial agents forecasts on changes in FED decisions, re-
ducing the impact of these decisions on interest rate levels. However, this impact
is already embedded in this analysis since the unexpected part of U.S. monetary
policy rates has been taken into consideration. According to the second link,
a greater transparency enables to improve market knowledge about monetary
policy. In addition, it can enhance the FED's credibility. Thus, both these
consequences of a greater transparency can explain the reduction of market rate
15
reaction to unexpected policy rate decisions. This explanation is more plausible
than the ﬁrst one, which rests on the predictability of FED decisions.
On the contrary, a higher eﬀect of the diﬀusion of the FED decisions on the
interest rate volatility suggests that FED transparency, more particularly its
credibility, decreased after 1994. Indeed, in theory, there exists a negative rela-
tion between the degree of credibility and the size of the impact of the day on
which central bank decisions are diﬀused on market volatility. Although these
results may seem surprising, two types of explanations can be provided. The
ﬁrst rests on the question of the eﬀect of a new transparency measure on the
credibility degree. According to the literature, a higher transparency improves
the central bank credibility (Faust and Svensson (2001), Cukierman (2001), Ger-
aats et al. (2006)). This assumes that any type of transparency measure incites
monetary authorities to respect their objectives. However, the diﬀusion of the
FED decisions immediately after each FOMC meeting, frequently at schedule
time, does not provide any incentive for the FED to respect its objective13. In
sort, the immediate diﬀusion of the FED decisions cannot be considered as a
transparency measure that improves the central bank credibility. In addition,
basing on Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) methodology14,15, the constructed
credibility index (see Table 2) shows that credibility of FED increases since
1990. As for the third explanation, the eﬀect of central bank rate changes on
market volatility does not only depend on the central bank transparency and
credibility but also on other factors, such as the degree of ﬁnancial instabil-
ity. Authors like Banerjee (1992), Bikchandani et al. (1992), McQueen and
Roley (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1997), Veronesi (1999) show that the
main macroeconomic and monetary news strongly inﬂuence market operators
behaviour during not only monetary policy uncertainty but also during ﬁnan-
cial instability. Thus, without questioning the credibility of the FED, various
ﬁnancial crises occurring after 199416 may have created uncertainty on ﬁnancial
13In contrast, if the FED decides to publicly announce, for example, the weights put on
inﬂation and on economic growth then this measure can improve the its credibility. The case
of the United Kingdom is also a good illustration. The Bank of England switched to a more
open framework in 1992, pointing out to a need to enhance the credibility of monetary policy.
Since 1992, regular policy meetings have been held between the Government of the Bank of
England and Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the minutes of these meetings released to
the public within six weeks. In addition, an Inﬂation Report including economic data and
forecasts is published quarterly (King, 1997).
14In the literature, the most frequently used methodology to construct credibility index
is the methodology proposed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) (Faust and Svensson, 1998;
Hutchison and Walsh, 1998; Cecchetti and Krause, 2002).
15Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) methodology is presented in Appendix.
16Examples of crises are the U.S. Government bond crisis (January 1994), the Mexican crisis
16
Table 2: FED's credibility degree (%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
0.81 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.96
markets. This in turn, explains the greater impact of the FED decisions on U.S.
interest rates volatility.
(December 1994), the Asian crisis (July 1997), the Russian crisis (August 1998), the Brazilian
crisis (January 1999) or the Argentina crisis (November 2001).
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7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of a higher transparency on ﬁnancial mar-
ket reaction where the FED's decisions of immediate diﬀusion of its policy rate
after each FOMC meeting held regularly at scheduled time is interpreted as a
measure of transparency. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of this new transparency mea-
sure has been analysed on both reaction of U.S. Treasury rate and Government
bond rate level and volatility to news related to the FED's policy. These news
correspond to FED's target variables and to unexpected changes of policy rates.
How a greater transparency inﬂuences the predictability of the FED's rate has
also been analysed. The results obtained suggest that, since February 1994,
period where the FOMC has refrained from changing rates between meetings,
market participants have been able to anticipate better the FOMC decisions.
Moreover, the new measure adopted by the FED in January 1994, has been
clearly and honestly diﬀused to the public improving its transparency. This
observation is in accordance with the argument of Poole and Rasche (2000).
Speciﬁcally, the authors argue that since February 1994 market participants
have a better understanding of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy reaction
function. However, this new transparency measure does not seem to have an
inﬂuence on credibility.
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8 Appendix
Central bank credibility index
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) authors deﬁne monetary policy credibility as
"the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the policymaker's plans and the
public's beliefs about those plans". In this approach, the credibility index can
be expressed as:
Cre = 1 if E(pi) < pit,
Cre = 1− E(pi)− pi
t
0.2− pit if pi
t < E(pi) < 20%,
Cre = 0 if E(pi) > 20%.
The more the expected inﬂation (E(pi)) diverges from the level of the target
inﬂation (pit), the less credible the central bank is (Cre→ 0). In the same vein,
if the expected inﬂation is smaller than or close to the target level of inﬂation,
then the credibility of the central bank attains its maximum value (Cre→ 1).
Some authors, as Cecchetti and Krause (2002), while using this approach,
supposed the same level for the inﬂation target for all the countries they retained
in their empirical analysis. In addition, they also assume that the expected in-
ﬂation used in order to construct the credibility index is based on the realized
inﬂation of the previous period. Contrary to these authors, we ﬁx the same inﬂa-
tion target for the industrialized countries and the same target for the emerging
countries. For the industrialized countries, we suppose that the inﬂation target
is 2.12517, which corresponds to the average of the target ﬁx by some central
bank of industrialized countries practicing inﬂation target. As for the emerging
countries, we suppose that the inﬂation target is equal to 3.2518. Furthermore,
the expected inﬂation is obtained using data from Datastream.
172.125 correspond to the average value of the inﬂation target level ﬁxed by industrial
countries, as United Kingdom and Australia, during 90s.
183.25 correspond to the average value of the inﬂation target level ﬁxed by emerging coun-
tries, as Brazil and Mexico, during 90s.
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Table 6: Statistical properties of daily U.S. interest rates
3-month 6-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year
Lyung-Box (LB) test to the
squared residuals
LB(1) 45.095∗ 27.299∗ 3.592∗∗ 7.512∗ 18.264∗ 7.101∗
LB(5) 129.920∗ 107.380∗ 40.893∗ 48.647∗ 55.437∗ 47.970∗
LB(10) 165.969∗ 171.265∗ 63.716∗ 79.554∗ 92.816∗ 85.052∗
Box-Pierce (BP) test to the
squared residuals
BP(1) 45.047∗ 27.270∗ 3.591∗∗ 7.504∗ 18.244∗ 7.093∗
BP(5) 129.753∗ 107.205∗ 40.816∗ 48.558∗ 55.345∗ 47.884∗
BP(10) 165.702∗ 170.916∗ 63.572∗ 79.370∗ 92.611∗ 84.852∗
Box-Pierce statistics applied to the
absolute value of residuals
BP(1) 92.907∗ 75.259∗ 6.517∗ 7.629∗ 5.452∗ 3.673∗
BP(5) 360.440∗ 317.698∗ 89.972∗ 85.628∗ 76.874∗ 68.269∗
BP(10) 569.556∗ 572.175∗ 137.389∗ 143.439∗ 125.578∗ 115.960∗
LM test for ARCH eﬀect
LM(1) 45.048∗ 27.279∗ 3.591∗ 7.505∗ 18.483∗ 7.094∗
LM(5) 105.874∗ 89.727∗ 38.207∗ 44.478∗ 50.226∗ 43.474∗
LM(10) 124.858∗ 119.002∗ 52.665∗ 63.356∗ 72.962∗ 65.301∗
* and ** indicate that the corresponding coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10 % level, respectively.
Table 7: Statistical properties of innovations (1)
3-month 6-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year
LM test for ARCH eﬀect
LM(1) 67.333∗ 24.682∗ 3.297∗∗ 12.704∗ 23.042∗ 9.109∗
0.00) 0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LM(5) 144.309∗ 97.005∗ 49.927∗ 56.993∗ 57.820∗ 50.075∗
0.00) 0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LM(10) 165.563∗ 158.863∗ 71.586∗ 77.162∗ 79.297∗ 72.141∗
0.00) 0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
* and ** indicate that the corresponding coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10 % level, respectively.
1  correspond to the innovation series in the model described by equation (2).
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